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or both for transient occupancy in a dwellmg unit in a common interest development, in a dwelling unit in an apartment
building or complex, or in a single-family
home. This bill was signed by the Governor on July 8 (Chapter 134, Statutes of
1992).
AB 3469 (T. Friedman) was amended
to pertain only to savings and loan institutions (see infra agency report on
DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND
LOAN).
The following bills died in committee:
AB 2154 (Hannigan), which would have
changed the licensing/certification deadline applicable to any person who engages
in federally related real estate appraisal
activity, to the required date, including
administrative extensions, set by the Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council for regulation of federally related real
estate appraisal activity; and AB 2666
(Baker), which would have included in an
existing exemption from the definit10n of
a real estate broker any employee of a
broker performing specified functions in
connection with the renting or leasing of
real property managed by the broker and
used for vacation or recreational purposes,
other than timeshare management persons
who perform similar functions with regard
to real estate sales, exchanges, loans, or
loan servicing.

■ LITIGATION
On June 11, the bankruptcy reorganization plan of Pioneer Mortgage,
which filed for bankruptcy in January
1991, was approved by U.S. Bankruptcy
Court Judge James W. Meyers. [ 11:2
CRLR 127} Current Pioneer management
estimates that over the next five years,
investors may recover 35 cents on the
dollar: an additional 15 cents on the dollar
may be recovered by the investors from
several civil suits against Pioneer's service providers. Approximately 2,000 investors put about $200 mi Ilion into
Pioneer prior to its 1991 collapse. In addition to the civil litigation, the U.S.
Attorney's Office is investigating possible
criminal violations by former Pioneer executives.

DEPARTMENT OF
SAVINGS AND LOAN
Commissioner:
Wallace T Sumimoto
(415) 557-3666
(213) 736-2798
he Department of Savings and Loan
(DSL) is headed by a commissioner
who has "general supervision over all associations, savings and loan holding companies, service corporations, and other
persons" (Financial Code section 8050).
DSL holds no regularly scheduled meetings, except when required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The Savings
and Loan Association Law is in sections
5000 through I 0050 of the California
Financial Code. Departmental regulations
are m Chapter 2, Title IO of the California
Code of Regulations (CCR).
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■ MAJOR PROJECTS
Merger Bill Vetoed By Governor. On
September 30, Governor Wilson vetoed
SB 506 (McCorquodale), which would
have transferred the licensing and
regulatory functions of DSL, the Savings
and Loan Commissioner, the State Banking Department. and the Superintendent of
Banking to a newly-created Department
of State Banking and Savings and Loan.
[12:2&3 CRLR 185]In his veto message,
Governor Wilson stated that while he supports streamlining state government, SB
506 is "seriously flawed, and will not
achieve its intended goal." According to
Wilson, the bill would have eliminated
current authority, rules, regulations, and
orders of the established departments
"without proper. consistent, and well
defined transfer of these authorities to the
new department. The effect of this 1s to
leave some financial institutions, such as
transmitters of money orders, business
development corporations, local agency
securities, among others, unregulated by
any state agency." The Governor added
that the "underlying need to consolidate
the Department of Savmgs and Loan with
another state agency still exists. However,
this consolidation must be approached
with careful attention to the regulatory,
operational, and technical aspects of the
policy to provide regulatory protection for
the citizens of California."
HomeFed Seized by Federal
Regulators. On July 6. federal regulators
seized control of San Diego-based HomeFed Bank, the eighth largest savings and
loan institution in the country. HomeFed,
the largest S&L to fail in United States
history, is said to have lost$ I billion since
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1990 due to bad loans and foreclosed real
estate. Despite this action, HomeFed
remains open under the management of
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),
the federal agency created by Congress to
liquidate failed S&Ls. Although RTC and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
had hoped to sell Home Fed as a less costly
altemati veto liquidation, RTC lacked sufficient funds to protect any prospective
buyer from HomeFed's bad loans. OTS
Director Timothy Ryan blamed Congress
for causing HomeFed's takeover, claiming that when Congress failed to provide
RTC with the additional funds it needed in
order to complete the S&L clean-up, OTS
was forced to seize institutions that otherwise would have been the subject of assisted sales; according to OTS, rescuing
thrifts through assisted sales costs half as
much as seizure and liquidation. In
response to this criticism, House of Representatives Banking Committee staffers
noted that RTC ran out of money because
it failed to use all of the $25 billion Congress gave the agency in late 1991; although Congress established an April
deadline for using up the money, $17 billion remained unused by RTC at that time
and was thus frozen. [ 12:2&3 CRLR 18586]
OTS determined that HomeFed's weak
financial condition was due primarily to a
high level of non-performing assets, largely the result of poor investment decisions
implemented by former management. Although HomeFed Chair Kim Fletcher
blamed the thrift's problems on various
federal requirements, such as the strict
capital regulations which were implemented in 1989, former HomeFed Corporation Director David Dunn agreed that
the thrift was poorly run, adding that
HomeFed "pursued growth aggressively
without bringing judgment to bear on it."
Further, HomeFed president Thomas
Wageman has admitted that he knew at the
beginning of 1992 that the S&L faced
serious financial difficulties and would
require federal assistance.
FDIC Raises Premiums for Weak
S&Ls. Beginning January I, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
will increase insurance premiums paid by
S&Ls to FDIC to an average of 24 cents
per $ I 00 of deposits. However, the healthiest, best-managed institutions will be
exempt from the increase; only the
country's weaker S&Ls, whose risk of
failure is greater, will be subject to the
increased premiums. Presently, all FDICinsured institutions pay 23 cents in
premiums for every $ I 00 of deposits;
strong institutions-including about 60%
of FDIC-insured S&Ls and 75% of FDIC-
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insured banks-will continue to pay this
rate. Premiums for weaker institutions
will increase by three to eight cents per
$ I 00 in deposits, depending on which of
nine categories the institutions fall into;
each category reflects a graduated safety
rating. In determining risk category assignments, the Office of Thrift Supervision will use federal or state examination reports and other risk indicators.
The plan is designed to place the burden of strengthening the deposit insurance
fund on the institutions which pose the
greatest risk of failure. Although federal
regulators contend that such troubled institutions ought to pay more for deposit
insurance, they admit that the higher
premiums will increase the likelihood of
these S&Ls failing or being forced into
mergers because it will raise the cost of
doing business for S&Ls that already are
having difficulties making money. U.S.
Senator Donald Riegle, Jr. (D-Michigan),
chair of the Senate Banking Committee, is
critical of the plan, which he has stated is
too lenient. Riegle believes that all
federally-insured institutions should bear
the costs of rebuilding the insurance fund.
The rate increase is expected to raise an
additional $200 million per year from the
savings and loan industry, and approximately $600 million per year from
banks, which are subject to the same
premium increases.
New Federal Rules Hasten Shutdown of Ailing S&Ls. In late September,
the Office of Thrift Supervision adopted
tough new rules which will speed the
closure of troubled S&Ls. The corrective
action scheme, which took effect on
December 19, implements new section 38
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and
divides financial institutions into five
categories: well-capitalized. adequately
capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapi talized. Regulatory responses are
similarly graded-stronger restnctions
are imposed as an institution falls into
lower categories. An institution will be
deemed to be:
-well-capitalized if it has a total riskbased capital ratio of 6% or greater, and a
leverage ratio of 5% or greater, and the
institution is not subject to an order, wntten agreement, capital directive, or prompt
corrective action directive to meet and
maintain a specific capital level for any
capital measure;
-adequately capitalized if it has a total
risk-based capital ratio of 8% or greater, a
Tier I risk-based capital ratio of 4% or
greater, and a leverage ratio of 4% or
greater (or a leverage ratio of3% or greater
if the institution is rated composite I in its
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most recent report of examination, subject
to appropriate federal guidelines), and the
institution does not meet the definition of
a well-capitalized institution;
-undercapitalized if it has a total riskbased capital ratio that is less than 8%, a
Tier I risk-based capital ratio that is less
than 4%, or a leverage ratio that is less than
4% (or a leverage ratio that is less than 3%
if the institution is rated composite I in its
most recent report of examination, subject
to appropriate federal guidelines);
-significantly undercapitalized if it has
a total risk-based capital ratio that is less
than 6%, a Tier I risk-based capital rat10
that is less than 3%, or a leverage ratio that
is less than 3%; or
-cntically undercapitalized if it has a
ratio of tangible equity to total assets that
is equal to or less than 2%.
Section 38's most severe response occurs when an institution is determined by
regulators to be critically undercapitalized. Once an institution reaches that
level, regulators generally will be required
to close it within 90 days, unless its condition dramatically improves. According
to the latest federal estimate, about 29
S&Ls with a total of$57.5 billion in assets
currently fit this category, and are in
danger of being closed either prior to or
within 90 days of the December 19 effective date.
Section 38's specific capital targets
and progressive responses provide S&L
executives with adequate knowledge of
their capital classification. Formal
notification is given through inspection
reports by federal regulators; in addition,
informal hearings are provided when an
institution's capital classification is
downgraded. This new regulatory action
is intended to alert executives and
regulators to an institution's declining
health, encourage weaker institutions to
correct their problems quickly, and save
insurance fund money by closing weak
S&Ls while there is still some capital left
in them.
California Thrifts Lead Nation in
Bad Loans. According to a report by
Texas-based Sheshunoff Information Services, a bank consulting firm. California's
S&Ls led the nation in the amount of bad
loans during the first quarter of 1992. According to the report, the state's S&Ls had
$8.7 billion in bad loans, more than three
times the amount in any other state. However, problem loans at the state's savings
and loan institutions comprised 3.8% of
total loans,just slightly above the national
average of 3.3%.
Regulators Criticized for Ignoring
Lending Bias. In conjunction with a September hearing of the Senate Banking

Committee's Housing Subcommittee,
Senator Alan Cranston (D-California)
contended that bank and thrift regulators
have been lax in their enforcement of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and
other fair lending laws; the CRA requires
lenders to meet the credit needs of their
entire communities, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods.
Cranston stated that regulators have given
87% of the banks and savings and loan
institutions reviewed a rating of "satisfactory" or better during examinations over
the last two years, despite evidence that
minority and inner city areas continue to
be underserved by depository lending institutions. For example, a recent Los Angeles Times study of lending patterns in
Los Angeles County showed that Wells
Fargo and Bank of America-the biggest
financial lenders in the state-made a
combined total of 113 loans to AfricanAmericans in 1990; however, both banks
received "outstanding" CRA ratings from
their federal evaluator, the Comptroller of
the Currency. That same Los Angeles
Times study also showed that S&Ls are
much more active than banks in lending to
African-Americans and other minority
group members.
Senator Cranston said his staff found
instances when FDIC examiners found
possible violations of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and the Federal Fair
Housing Act, but failed to report the situation to the Justice Department as is required under federal law. Representatives
of the banking industry said that lenders
do not intentionally discriminate against
low-income, inner city communities, although they acknowledge that low-income, minonty borrowers sometimes face
obstacles in obtaining credit. According to
the Independent Bankers Association of
America (!BAA), bankers cite the CRA as
one of the most onerous regulations with
which they must comply; small banks
with limited resources find the CRA's requirements for providing and analyzing
data particularly burdensome, according
to IBAA. Cranston criticized the federal
regulators' apparent sympathy toward the
financial institutions, stating that "[t]he
tendency of agencies to act as protectors
of the banks rather than as regulators
profoundly distorts the process."

■ LEGISLATION
The following is a status update on
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 12,
Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992) at page
186:
SB 506 (McCorquodale) would have
transferred the licensing and regulatory
functions of DSL, the Savings and Loan
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Commissioner, the State Banking Department, and the Superintendent of Banking
to the Department of State Banking and
Savings and Loan, which the bill would
have created. This bill was vetoed by the
Governor on September 30.
AB 3469 (T. Friedman). Existing
provisions of the Savings Association
Law prescnbe various criminal offenses
and penalties for violations thereof, and
provide for forfeiture of property or
proceeds derived from these violations.
This bill expands those provisions to include other offenses the violation of which
would be subject to forfeiture under the
Savings Association Law. This bill also
provides that a petition for forfeiture may
be filed prior to, in conjunction with, or
subsequent to a criminal proceeding, and
if filed prior to the criminal proceedings,
the prosecuting agency shall provide concurrent notice to any parties subject to the
proposed forfeiture that they are targets of
an anticipated criminal action. The petition and any injunctive order shall be dismissed unless a criminal complaint is filed
within 120 days after the filing of the
petition. The bill also provides that no
injunctive order shall impair the ability of
a defendant or interested party to pay legal
fees relating to the criminal charges.
Existing law provides that the
proceeds of forfeited property shall be distributed to the bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional sales vendor, or holder
of a valid lien, mortgage, or security interest, as specified. This bill provides that the
balance of any forfeited funds shall also
be distributed to the victim of specified
crimes committed by the defendants. This
bill was signed by the Governor on September 30 (Chapter 1280, Statutes of
1992).
ABX 45 (Peace), which would have
prohibited state, city, and county governments from contracting for services with
financial institutions with $100 million or
more in assets unless those companies file
reports annually with the state Controller,
and SB 1396 (Marks), which would have
required financial institutions which assemble, evaluate, or disseminate information on the checking account experiences
of consumer customers of banks or other
financial institutions to give specified
notices to new customers, died in committee.

■ LITIGATION
On July I0, in one of the numerous
lawsuits stemming from the failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan, a federal jury ordered financier Charles Keating, Jr., and
three co-defendants to pay over $3 billion
in damages for conspiring to defraud in-

vestors; specifically, the jury awarded the
20,000 class action plaintiffs $600 million
in compensatory damages and$ 1.5 billion
in punitive damages from Keating, and
$1.4 billion in compensatory damages and
$900 million in punitive damages from
Keating's co-defendants. [ Jl: 1 CRLR
105J However, U.S. District Court Judge
Richard Bilby had instructed the jury that
it could not award punitive damages
against any defendant other than Keating;
it is unclear whether Judge Bilby will
allow the $900 million award. Keating,
already in prison on California criminal
convictions stemming from the same activities, sent no lawyers to defend him in
the damages phase of this civil proceeding, claiming that he could not afford to.
Keating was scheduled to go on trial in
Los Angeles in October on federal
criminal charges of fraud, conspiracy, and
racketeering stemming from the 1989 collapse of Lincoln.
On June 24, former Columbia Savings
and Loan Chief Executive Thomas
Spiegel was indicted on 55 criminal
counts; the federal charges allege that
Spiegel misappropriated millions of dollars from the now-defunct S&L. Among
other things, federal officials contend that
Spiegel made misrepresentations to
federal regulators and Columbia's board
of directors regarding his compensation;
used$ I million of the S&L's money to buy
a vacation condominium in Palm Springs
for his family; and used the S&L's money
to buy tens of thousands of dollars worth
of firearms and accessories. If convicted,
Spiegel faces up to 275 years in prison and
$ I 3 million in fines. Columbia failed in
January 1991, largely due to losses on its
huge holdings of real estate and risky,
high-yield junk bonds; the total cost of the
S&L's failure to taxpayers is estimated at
$1.2 billion. [ll:2 CRLR 128-29]
In Statesman Savings Holding Corporation and Glendale Federal Bank v.
United States, Nos. 90-773C and 90-772C
(July 24, 1992), both plaintiffs acquired
failing savings and loan institutions prior
to the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA ); in both cases,
plaintiffs negotiated certain terms, such as
capital standards, with the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation. Following FIRREA's enactment, Statesman and
Glendale were no longer afforded the
favorable terms that had been part of their
agreement with the federal government.
Plaintiffs claimed that FIRREA's enactment breached their contracts with the
government and effected a taking in violation of the fifth amendment of the U.S.
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Constitution.
Relying on its previous ruling in
Wins tar Corporation v. U.S., 21 Cl.Ct. 112
(1990), the U.S. Claims Court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
as to liability, finding that the agreements
between plaintiffs and the federal government constituted contracts, and that the
enactment of FIRREA breached those
contracts in light of the sovereign acts
doctrine. As a result of its finding, the
court deferred consideration of plaintiffs'
constitutional claim. Although the court
found that plaintiffs are entitled to restitution, it did not set that amount; instead,
anticipating an appeal by the federal
government, the court certified its
decision for interlocutory appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (For a summary of a related case, see
12: I CRLR 129-30.)

159

